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Abstract: Many real systems are strongly characterized by collective cooperative phenomena whose
existence and properties still need a satisfactory explanation. Coherently with their collective nature, they
call for new and more accurate descriptions going beyond pairwise models, such as graphs, in which all
the interactions are considered as involving only two individuals at a time. Hypergraphs respond to this
need, providing a mathematical representation of a system allowing from pairs to larger groups. In this
work, through the use of different hypergraphs, we study how group interactions influence the evolution
of cooperation in a structured population, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of the public goods
game. Here we show that, likewise network reciprocity, group interactions also promote cooperation.
More importantly, by means of an invasion analysis in which the conditions for a strategy to survive are
studied, we show how, in heterogeneously-structured populations, reciprocity among players is expected
to grow with the increasing of the order of the interactions. This is due to the heterogeneity of connections
and, particularly, to the presence of individuals standing out as hubs in the population. Our analysis
represents a first step towards the study of evolutionary dynamics through higher-order interactions,
and gives insights into why cooperation in heterogeneous higher-order structures is enhanced. Lastly,
it also gives clues about the co-existence of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors related to the
structural properties of the interaction patterns.
Keywords: cooperation; evolutionary dynamics; higher-order interactions; hypergraphs.
1. Introduction
In behavioral terms, cooperation is the providing of a benefit to another individual at some cost for
the provider. In well-mixed populations, where all individuals interact with each other, evolutionary game
theory predicts that cooperation cannot survive due to the existence of selfish behaviors [1,2]. Nevertheless,
we do observe cooperation in many different real systems, ranging from genomes to human societies [3–6],
and not as a marginal phenomenon: rather, it often strongly shapes and makes even possible the existence
of those systems. For example, without cooperative behaviors like the work division and the establishment
and respect of social norms, the humankind could not have developed even the simplest forms of society.
Among microbes, some viruses and cells have been observed to be involved in (involuntary) cooperative
behaviors that are essential for their reproduction and diffusion [4,6]. The existence of cooperation in
biological and social systems has led to hypothesize several mechanisms to explain its ubiquity: inclusive
fitness, direct and indirect reciprocity, punishment, cultural group selection, etc. (clearly, those requiring
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
03
89
3v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  6
 Ju
n 2
02
0
2 of 24
substantial cognitive demands, apply only to human’s social systems) [7–13]. Among those mechanisms,
we focus on the so-called network reciprocity [14–22].
Generally speaking, an act of reciprocity takes place when some individual returns a beneficial act
received by someone else, establishing a fruitful mutual exchange. Therefore, it is a cooperative act. In
particular, one refers to network reciprocity when the mutual cooperative exchange is sustained by the
existence of a suitable structure of interactions, represented through a network, among the individuals of a
population. Two conditions lie at the base of network reciprocity: a limited, recurrent set of interacting
game opponents (thus avoiding the anonymity between them); and a local adaptation mechanism through
which an individual can change (update) its behavior (strategy) depending on how its neighbors in the
network behave and perform. Apart from its fascinating theoretical character, network reciprocity is
regarded as one of the most important and interesting of the mechanisms from an application point of
view. Indeed, the easiness of its requirements to be fulfilled, makes it a transverse mechanism applicable
not only to those system made of rational units (e.g., social, economical), but also to those whose units are
capable of only very simple behaviors (e.g., many biological systems) [21].
The use of networks to formalize the topology of interactions within a system, however, tacitly
assumes that all the interactions that occur in the system are essentially pairwise. This may not be a
satisfactory description for those real systems exhibiting higher-order interactions to which more than two
entities participate together and which are not reducible to combinations of lower-order ones. Examples
of such interactions include triadic [23] and higher-order closures in social networks [24], co-authorship
networks in science [25], spatial coexistence relations among species in an ecosystem [26], and trigenic
interactions in genetic networks [27]. In all such cases, representing the interaction patterns through a
network (that is, approximating those higher-order interactions with pairwise ones) implies the loss of
essential information to understand their dynamics [28].
This work tries to bring network reciprocity closer to reality. We investigate the effect of considering
higher-order interactions, using hypergraphs, on the evolution of cooperation when the population of
individuals possesses structural correlations. Hypergraphs allow to distinguish the dynamics on a clique
of m individuals (an m-clique), in which each of the individuals (vertices) interacts separately, in pair, with
each of the other m−1 individuals, from the dynamics in which the m individuals interact all together,
as a group, in an intrinsically different way (represented as a hyperedge of cardinality m). Moreover,
hypergraphs, and also other higher-order representations as well [29], solve the lack of uniqueness in
defining group interactions from pairwise information only.
We show here that the mechanism of network reciprocity can be successfully extended to higher-order
structures and that, in fact, it even becomes reinforced.
2. Dynamics
2.1. Public Goods Dilemma
To study cooperation in presence of higher-order interactions we need a game definable for any
number of players (the size of the group) and belonging to the class of social dilemmas. In such games, the
equilibrium solution under unilateral changes of strategy (i.e., considering changes of strategy of only one
player at a time), called Nash equilibrium, is not the most efficient solution for all the players (i.e., it is not
Pareto-efficient). In particular, in the type of game we are interested in, the equilibrium solution is the one
in which all the players choose to defect, although the Pareto-efficient solution is the one in which they all
cooperate, hence the social dilemma. The prototypical m-players dilemma of this kind is the public goods
game (PGG). Each player, independently, chooses whether to put (cooperating) or not (defecting) a certain
amount b (fixed for all players, in our setup) into a public pot. The collected sum is re-scaled by a synergy
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factor α ∈ R, α > 1, and equally redistributed among the m players disregarding of their strategy. When
nc ≤ m− 1 neighbors cooperate, a player with strategy σ (set to 1 if cooperates, 0 if defects) gets a payoff
f (σ) given by
f (σ) = b
[( α
m
− 1
)
σ+
α (m− 1)
m
q
]
(1)
where q ≡ nc/(m− 1) is the fraction of neighbors that cooperate. The first term accounts for the cost and
proportional gain from the contribution to the pot of the player, while the second corresponds to the gain
received from the cooperating neighbors. Since the second term is always non-negative, the best response
for a player depends on whether α is smaller or greater than m. The dilemma exists for α < m because, in
this case, according to Equation (1), the best strategy for any player is to defect. However, each of them
gets a null payoff, whereas it would be positive if all of them chose to cooperate.
2.2. Structural Connectivity
We give here a brief introduction to the connectivity structures we use in this work: simple
hypergraphs. Given a finite set V of vertices and a family E of subsets {eI}I⊆V of V, the couple H = (V, E)
defines a hypergraph, and each eI is called hyperedge, representing a relation among all the vertices in it. The
maximum and minimum cardinality (degree) of the hyperedges in H are called the rank and co-rank of the
hypergraph, respectively: rank(H) = mmax and co-rank(H) = mmin. If they both are equal, with value
s ∈ N, the hypergraph is said to be s-uniform [30].
Another important concept is the 2-section of H. We can define it as the graph whose vertices are
the vertices of H, and where two distinct vertices form an edge if and only if they belong to, at least, one
common hyperedge in H [30].
Additionally, an hypergraph H is called simple if eI ⊆ eJ ⇒ I = J. This means that it has no repeated
hyperedges, and can be obtained from a generic hypergraph (V, E) removing from E all the hyperedges
which are subsets of at least another hyperedge.
Finally, given the family S(i) of hyperedges {eJ}J⊆V containing vertex i, and assuming no repeated
hyperedge, we define the m-degree k(i)m of i as the number of hyperedges of degree m in S(i). The generalized
degree of node i is the number of hyperedges incident on it, given by
k(i) =
mmax
∑
m=mmin
k(i)m (2)
We construct a hypergraph starting from a certain base network and converting in hyperedges a
randomly selected fraction p of its 3-cliques, see Section 6.1 for further details. From now on, we will call
these selected hyperedges as triangles.
2.3. Public Goods Dynamics in Hypergraphs
At the base of our model lie the following microscopic rules, imposed at each time step (round): (i)
each player plays with its strategy, either cooperate or defect, within each of the hyperedges incident on it;
(ii) each strategist chooses one of its neighbors uniformly at random in the 2-section of the hypergraph,
and performs the strategy update. These steps are performed synchronously by all the players.
The payoff f (i)(t) that player i with m-degree k(i)m and playing with strategy σi(t) got at the end of a
time step t, obeys the following dynamic equation:
f (i)(t) = b
mmax
∑
m=mmin
k(i)m
[( α
m
− 1
)
σi(t) +
α(m− 1)
m
q(i)m (t)
]
(3)
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where q(i)m (t) is the probability that a neighbor of node i, in a hyperedge of degree m, cooperates at time t.
To explore different selection pressure regimes, we consider smoothed imitation by taking, as probability
function for the strategy update, the Fermi distribution function:
F (∆ f ; β) = 1
1+ e−β∆ f
(4)
where ∆ f is the difference between the payoff of the randomly chosen neighbor and the payoff of the focal
player, and parameter β > 0 allows to regulate the strength of the selection process: strong and sharp for
high values of β, weak and noisy for low values).
The global state of a population of size N is defined by the density of cooperators:
c(t) =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
σi(t) (5)
We initialize the system with a fraction c0 ≡ c(t = 0) of randomly selected cooperators.
From Equation (3) it immediately follows that c = 0 and c = 1 are absorbing states of the dynamics,
for no change of state is possible from them.
3. Results
For every set of hypergraphs we report the effective asymptotic cooperators density c∞ and the
convergence time t as a function of α and for different values of the conversion fraction p, as found in the
performed Monte Carlo (MC) simulations; see Section 6.2 for further details. To systematically reveal the
effect on the dynamics of converting 3-cliques in triangles, we report the results found for hypergraphs
generated through the Holme-Kim model (HK) [31] and the Dorogotsev-Mendes model (DM) [32]. They
both grow heterogeneous networks having topological properties typical of many real complex systems,
and in particular social networks, like power-law degree distributions, the small-world property, and high
transitivity (i.e., high clustering coefficient).
Let us call αsurv(p) the value of α at which, for a given p, the asymptotic cooperator density c∞
starts to grow above zero, to be compared with the corresponding critical value αcr(p) for a well-mixed
population. To this purpose, we define
r(p) ≡ αsurv(p)
αcr(p)
(6)
where
αcr(p) =
mmax
∑
m=mmin
m pm (7)
being pm the fraction of hyperedges of cardinality m in the hypergraph. Values of r(p) smaller than 1
mean some level of structural reciprocity favoring the survival of cooperation. As a particular case, r(0)
measures the network reciprocity.
In Figure 1 we show the results for MC simulations with c0 = 0.5 and two values of β, on hypergraphs
stemming from HK networks with N = 500 vertices, m = 3 (average degree 〈k〉 ≈ 6 on the 2-section) and
Pt = 1. Parameter Pt, the probability of making a triad-formation step after a preferential-attachment step
in the HK model, has been set to 1 to get the maximum possible transitivity, thus making more evident
the effects of increasing the fraction p of converted 3-cliques. We find that, as we increase p from 0 to 1,
r(p) decreases monotonically from 0.78 to 0.60 when β = 1, and from 0.79 to 0.63 when β = 0.1. Thus,
reciprocity is enhanced when we increase p, the fraction of 3-cliques promoted to triangular hyperedges.
We also note how, by decreasing β (weaker selection), the structural reciprocity decreases as well.
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Figure 1. Asymptotic density of cooperators c (top) and convergence time t (bottom) versus r, for
hypergraphs generated from HK networks with N = 500 vertices, m = 3 (average degree 〈k〉 ≈ 6),
Pt = 1, and for β = 1 (left) and β = 0.1 (right). The values of p are specified in the legend, and c0 = 0.5.
The dashed line at r = 1 indicates the abrupt transition for a well-mixed population, as predicted by the
MF theory.
Looking at the convergence times in Figure 1, we see the typical peaked shape characterizing the
critical region. Dealing with small finite systems, we expect the convergence time to show a peak near
the transition, but still to remain finite. Since the maximum number of allowed time steps tmax is fixed to
2× 104, and we average over 100 realizations, we can state that, if the average convergence time is smaller
than 200, then all the trials converged and the final populations are perfectly homogeneous; note that this
is only a sufficient condition. In this case, an effective cooperation density c∞ other than 0 or 1 represents
an average of homogeneous final states. This is the case for r values out of the transition region.
Counting how many times the system has not converged nNC in 100 realizations, and knowing
the value of the average convergence time t, the average time tC the system took to converge in the
remaining 100− nNC trials is tC = 100[t− nNC(tmax/100)]/(100− nNC). For the previous hypergraphs
we find nNC ≤ 12.3 for β = 1.0 and nNC ≤ 2.4 for β = 0.1, in the critical regions. The maximum values
of tC are found to be around 1490 and 710, respectively. Being tC well below tmax, we expect that the
non-convergence of some realizations does not depend on the value chosen for the latter. This suggests
that the lack of convergence is not a purely dynamical effect —like at the critical point for an infinite
well-mixed population—, but it is due to the topological constraints of the structure. In fact, we find the
presence of configurations of local states preventing the system to escape from them, acting as topological
traps, see Section 4.3.
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Figure 2. Asymptotic density of cooperators c (top) and convergence time t (bottom) versus r, for
hypergraphs generated from DM networks with N = 500 vertices (average degree 〈k〉 = 4) and for
β = 1 (left) and β = 0.1 (right). The values of p are specified in the legends, and c0 = 0.5. The dashed line
at r = 1 indicates the first-order transition for a well-mixed population, as predicted by the MF theory.
We also note that with the increasing of p, the critical region gets wider, whatever is the value of β. In
Section 4.2.2, we give an explanation for this based on the degree heterogeneity and the local clustering of
the structure.
Quite similar results are found for hypergraphs stemming from DM networks. In Figure 2 we show
the results obtained for base networks with N = 500 vertices (〈k〉 = 4). Going from p = 0 to p = 1, we get
the following monotonically decreasing values of r(p): from 0.75 to 0.58 for β = 1, from 0.78 to 0.62 for
β = 0.1. Furthermore, we find, respectively, nNC ≤ 39.7 and nNC = 0 in the critical regions. The maximum
values of tC are found to be around 2660 and 380. As for HK hypergraphs, setting tmax = 5× 104, we find
no significant differences. In Appendix B we report the results obtained also for c0 = 0.3 and c0 = 0.7.
In the case of hypergraphs derived from Erdo˝s-Rényi networks (ER) [33], the transitions are always
sharp and just below r = 1 (see Appendix C), given the high structural homogeneity and low clustering of
ER networks. The average convergence time is found not over 300 steps, along with the absence of traps.
4. Mathematical Analysis
4.1. Mean-Field Approximation
The mean-field (MF) approach relies on two approximations: (i) all the vertices have the same
m-degree sequence (〈kmmin〉, . . . , 〈kmmax〉), averaged over the original hypergraph with m-degree sequence
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distribution P(kmmin , . . . , kmmax); (ii) the local states of different vertices are not correlated. Then, a simple
master equation for the density of cooperators c(t) follows:
c(t + 1) = c(t) + c(t) (1− c(t)) (F (∆ f )−F (−∆ f )) (8)
where
∆ f = 〈 f (c)〉 − 〈 f (d)〉 = b
mmax
∑
m=mmin
( α
m
− 1
)
〈km〉 (9)
Imposing c(t + 1) = c(t) we get, besides the absorbing state solutions c(t) = 0 and c(t) = 1, ∀α, the
stationary solution corresponding to F (∆ f ) = F (−∆ f ), that is, ∆ f = 0, given by
α = αcr ≡
mmax
∑
m=mmin
〈km〉
mmax
∑
m=mmin
m−1〈km〉
=
mmax
∑
m=mmin
mpm = 〈m〉 (10)
for all c(0) ∈ (0, 1), being
pm =
m−1〈km〉
mmax
∑
m=mmin
m−1〈km〉
(11)
the fraction of hyperedges of cardinality m or, for a well-mixed population, the probability of playing in a
group of size m, and 〈m〉 their average cardinality. Equation (10) gives the expected abrupt phase transition
between full defection and full cooperation, for an infinite well-mixed population, in the presence of either
one or more allowed group sizes (corresponding to uniform and non-uniform hypergraphs, respectively).
To be precise, the shown abrupt transition holds in the limit of an infinite population. The
finite-size, trivially-structured version of a well-mixed population is an all-connected-to-all structure. Then,
considering a m-uniform complete simple hypergraph of N vertices, it can be shown (see Appendix A)
that, for βb 1, the transition is at α ≡ αmcr = m(N− 1)/(N−m), greater than αcr = m for any finite value
of N. Additionally, αmcr/αcr grows with m. This finite-size effect slightly raises the structural reciprocity
herein reported.
4.2. Invasion Analysis
The MF prediction is clearly reliable only for highly homogeneous structures. In all the other
cases, instead, it serves as a reference point for measuring the structural reciprocity due to the complex
heterogeneity of connections. In this section, we study the conditions for the invasion of the structured
population, or for the resistance to be invaded for a player, using a certain strategy in specific configurations.
We give a justification to the higher reciprocity level and the enlargement of the transition region, both
found when increasing p in the used heterogeneous hypergraphs.
4.2.1. The Role of Cooperator Hubs
For all the analyzed scale-free networks in Figures 1 and 2), we observe the transition moving towards
notable smaller values of r, whatever is the value of p. This is not the case for homogeneous hypergraphs,
like the ones derived from ER networks. We show here that the key difference is the presence of hubs in
the former networks.
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We focus on a cooperator hub with m-degree sequence (khubmmin , . . . , k
hub
mmax), surrounded by neighbors
with average k-degree sequence (k¯mmin , . . . , k¯mmin), where
k¯m = k¯m({khubm }) =∑
km
P(km|khubm ) km (12)
Imposing the payoff of the hub playing as cooperator is equal to the average payoff of its neighbors
playing as defectors, f (hub) = f¯ (d), we get the threshold value αhubth above which, whenever the hub and
any of its defector neighbors match for the strategy update, the survival of the hub is favored. Indicating
with q¯(d)0 = c0N/(N − 1) and q(hub)0 = q¯(d)0 − 1/(N − 1) the initial (t = 0) average fraction of cooperating
neighbors, respectively, of the hub’s defector neighbors and of the hub itself, from Equation (3) we find
αhubth =
mmax
∑
m=mmin
khubm
mmax
∑
m=mmin
[
khubm
m
+
m− 1
m
(
q(hub)0 k
hub
m − q¯(d)0 k¯m
)] (13)
Considering s-uniform hypergraphs and putting k¯s = ξskhubs , from Equation (13) follows
rhub ≡ α
hub
th
αcr
=
1
1+ (s− 1)(q(hub)0 − q¯(d)0 ξs)
(14)
which is a monotone decreasing function of s and, for ξs < 1− (N c0)−1, of c0 as well (left panel of
Figure 3). Taking as hubs those vertices with degree equal or larger, respectively, to the 97th and the 99th
percentile of the degree distribution, we get, for each value of s, a small interval in which, the values
of r(p) found in the simulations for c0 = 0.5, fit well. In fact, we expect Equation (13) to work well for
intermediate values of c0, as commented in Appendix D. Moreover, we expect the method to work for β
large enough, when the imitation process is more deterministic.
To evaluate Equation (13) we take khubs as the average degree of those vertices classified as hubs and
then compute the corresponding average value of ξs. Setting c0 = 0.5, for HK hypergraphs we find rhub
between 0.71 and 0.79 for s = 2, and between 0.55 and 0.65 for s = 3; for DM hypergraphs we get rhub
between 0.72 and 0.79 for s = 2, and between 0.56 and 0.65 for s = 3. In Figure 3 (left panel), to visualize
rhub versus s, we reported the values taken by the former computed considering ξs as independent of s
and fixed equal to (ξ2 + ξ3)/2, taking ξ2 and ξ3 as the average of the respective values found in the used
hypergraphs. In fact, only ξ2 and ξ3 are accessible in HK and DM hypergraphs. Nevertheless, ξs only
decreases by about 0.01 going from s = 2 to s = 3, therefore keeping it fixed is a sensible choice.
When α > αhubth , a cooperator hub is resilient to the invasion by any defector in its neighborhood
and, by persisting in the cooperative state, gives rise to a cooperative community whose members sustain
each other (for a similar dynamics on networks see [17]). In this way, this community is able to enlarge
itself further or, at least, to resist to be invaded by the defectors in the neighborhoods, thanks to the local
topological constraints. Remarkably, in HK and DM networks, by construction, the hubs are frequently
very close to each other (first or second neighbors), making it easier for the cooperative community to
thrive when more than one of them happens to be in the cooperative state. When, instead, the hub is
a defector, its local proliferation is favored whatever is the value of α. However, once a defector hub
easily succeeded in converting all its lower-degree cooperator neighbors in defectors, none of the players
in this defective community provide/receive any benefit playing within it. This prevents the defective
community to cover the entire population, unless α is enough small, outside the critical region.
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Figure 3. Left. The ratio rhub ≡ αhubth /αcr versus the rank s of a s-uniform hypergraph, for the survival of a
cooperator hub, for different values of c0. The values of rhub are computed by taking as hubs those vertices
with degree equal or larger to the 97th and the 99th percentile of the degree distribution, respectively; they
are shown as the top and bottom lines corresponding to the same value of c0. ξs = (ξ2 + ξ3)/2, ∀s (see
main text for details). Right. The combined probability of Equation (17) that, in a 2-uniform (solid lines)
and 3-uniform (dashed lines) DM hypergraph, an isolated defector d survives and w = 1 of its |Ω(d)| = 8
cooperator neighbors changes strategy, as a function of α, for the values of |Ω| reported in the legend,
κd = 1.75, β = 1 and b = 1.
4.2.2. The Role of Isolated defectors
Let us now consider the limit case in which a σ1-strategist is totally surrounded —up to its zth
neighborhood, with z large enough— by σ2-strategists, with σ1 6= σ2, to calculate the joint probability
that the σ1-strategist survives and some of the σ2-strategists adopt strategy σ1, as a function of α. The
probability pi(t) that a player of strategy σi and neighbors Ω(i) changes its strategy, reads:
pi(t) =
1
|Ω(i)| ∑j∈Ω(i)
σj 6=σi
F
(
f (j)(t)− f (i)(t)
)
(15)
In particular, considering a defector d of degree pair (k(d)2 , k
(d)
3 ) as the isolated strategist, the probability for
it to survive as a defector at time t is equal to 1− pd(t), in which the difference between the payoff f (j)(t)
of a cooperator neighbor j and its payoff f (d)(t) is given by:
f (j)(t)− f (d)(t) = b
[
α
(
k(j)2 −
1
2
k(d)2 + k
(j)
3 −
2
3
k(d)3 − a(j)
)
− k(j)2 − k(j)3
]
(16)
where a(j) is equal to 1/2 if j is a neighbor through a link and to κ(j)d /3 if it is a neighbor through a triangle,
where κ(j)d is the number of triangles that j shares with vertex d. Similarly, the probability that a cooperator
neighbor j becomes a defector is equal to F
(
f (d)(t)− f (j)(t)
)
/ |Ω(j)|.
To get interesting insights it is sufficient to consider all the defector’s neighbors (all cooperators) as
equivalent to the average vertex in the neighborhood. Therefore, they have the same degree pair (k(c)2 , k
(c)
3 ),
the same number of neighbors |Ω|, the same κd and, consequently, the same payoff f (c)(t); it makes
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sense because the neighbors are selected uniformly at random when updating the strategies. Then, the
probability for d of surviving as a defector and invading all at once w ≤ |Ω(d)| neighboring sites reads
(1− pd(t)) ·
[
1
|Ω|F
(
f (d)(t)− f (c)(t)
)]w
(17)
In Figure 3 (right panel) we show this combined probability computed for w = 1, |Ω(d)| = 8, different
values of |Ω|, κd = 1.75, and in the presence of either only links (p = 0) or only triangles (p = 1). These
values correspond to neighborhoods compatible with DM and HK hypergraphs (see Appendix E for
details). Interestingly, the defector should prefer interacting through triangles whenever |Ω(d)| > |Ω| and
through links otherwise. This is simply understood observing that, thanks to the percolation of 3-cliques
(or triangles) present in HK and DM networks (hypergraphs), k(d)3
∣∣∣
p=1
is close to k(d)2
∣∣∣
p=0
; in particular,
k(i)3
∣∣∣
p=1
= k(i)2
∣∣∣
p=0
− 1, ∀i, for DM structures. Since when d plays within a triangle obtains two times
what it gets playing within a link, it is advantageous playing through triangles whenever it possesses a
sufficient number of neighbors. In Figure 3 we also note that, for |Ω| sufficiently smaller than |Ω(d)|, the
probability of proliferating for the defective strategy counter-intuitively slightly increases with α (or r),
even above the mean-field critical point (r = 1).
Taken together, these observations suggest that such dependence on α may contribute substantially
to the reported enlargement of the critical region when p is increased. Specifically, on one hand, the
increasing of α always brings the cooperators’ performance closer to the defectors’ in any local instance
of the game, making it easier for cooperators to invade (with certainty, eventually); on the other hand,
defectors with high degrees are increasingly able to invade their neighborhoods, containing the diffusion
of the cooperative strategy. This competitive dynamics, existing only for heterogeneous structures, is thus
expected to delay the point at which cooperators succeed in fully invading the population, stretching out
the transition, which is almost abrupt in homogeneous random hypergraphs.
Next, we will explain why this competition gets fiercer when p is increased, enlarging even more the
transition region. From Equation (16) we can calculate the condition that the degrees of the defector and of
its cooperator neighbors have to fulfill in order that f (c) − f (d) decreases when α increases, thus raising
the competition. Taking, as done before, all the defector’s neighbors (all cooperators) as equivalent, by
imposing ∂( f (c) − f (d))/∂α < 0, we get
|Ω (d)|+ 1
|Ω (d)|
(
1
2
k(d)2 +
2
3
k(d)3
)
> k(c)2 + k
(c)
3 (18)
where |Ω(d)| = k(d)2 + 2k(d)3 /κd is the number of neighbors of the isolated defector, and κd is the number
of triangles that each of the cooperator neighbors shares with it. Since (|Ω(d)| + 1)/|Ω(d)| ≤ 3/2,
Equation (18) requires some overall degree heterogeneity in favor of the isolated defector. Instead, as
anticipated, for a regular hypergraph it always holds ∂( f (c)− f (d))/∂α > 0. Thus, when in a heterogeneous
structure a defector possesses enough higher degrees with respect to the surrounding cooperators, its
survival is favored when α is increased, smearing the transition.
To get some understanding about how this phenomenon depends on p, i.e., on the order of the
interactions, we refer to hypergraphs that become 3-uniform when p = 1, and 2-uniform when p = 0,
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like the ones we have used. Then, Equation (18) splits into the following conditions for p = 0 and p = 1,
respectively:
k(d)2
k(c)2
> 2− 1
k(c)2
(19)
k(d)3
k(c)3
>
3
2
− κd
2k(c)3
(20)
Equating the expressions taken by |Ω(σ)| for p = 0 and p = 1, the identity k(σ)3
∣∣∣
p=1
= k(σ)2
∣∣∣
p=0
· κσ/2,
to be read as k(σ)3 computed when p = 1, given k
(σ)
2 when p = 0, follows. We can then rewrite Equation (20)
in terms of k(d)2 and k
(c)
2 and directly compare it with Equation (19). Equation (20) becomes
k(d)2
k(c)2
>
3
2
κc
κd
− 1
k(c)2
(21)
where the degrees are calculated for p = 0. It follows that Equation (21) is a weaker condition than
Equation (19), i.e., Equation (19)⇒ Equation (21, if and only if κd/κc > 3/4. Remarkably, whenever the
latter inequality is fulfilled, ∂( f (c) − f (d))/∂α < 0 is more negative for p = 1 than for p = 0. Expressing κσ
in terms of the local clustering coefficient C(σ) and the link-degree k(σ)2 as κσ = [C(σ) · (k(σ)2 − 1)]p=0 (see
Appendix E for the derivation), we finally get
Equation (19)⇒ Equation (21) ⇐⇒
[
C(d) · (k(d)2 − 1)
C(c) · (k(c)2 − 1)
>
3
4
]
p=0
(22)
According to the inequalities in Equations (19) and (21), the most interesting case is obtained when
k(d)2 > k
(c)
2 . Then, Equation (22) can be satisfied even when the isolated defector possesses a smaller
clustering coefficient than its cooperators neighbors. Specifically, HK and DM models grow networks
whose local clustering coefficient C scales with the 2-degree k2 as C(k2) ∼ k−γ2 , where γ is around 0.8 for
HK (Pt = 1) and exactly 1 for DM (see Appendix E). Substituting in Equation (22), one finds that the above
implication holds whenever k(d)2 > k
(c)
2 , given γ ≤ 1.
If we now ask for k(d)2 such that, for a given k
(c)
2 , Equation (21) is satisfied but Equation (19) is not, we
find the condition
3
2
κc
κd
k(c)2 − 1 < k(d)2 ≤ 2k(c)2 − 1 (23)
where the degrees are calculated for p = 0. Therefore, if k(d)2 takes an intermediate value in the sense
of Equation (23), with respect to k(c)2 , Equation (21) is satisfied but Equation (19) is not, allowing the
competitive dynamics to take place for p = 1 but not for p = 0. As shown in Appendix E, such
intermediate neighborhoods actually exist in the structures we made use of. It must be noted that, for
k(d)2 > 2k
(c)
2 − 1, the competitive dynamics exists for p = 0 as well. However, as already observed, due to
the linear dependence of f (c) − f (d) on α, ∂( f (c) − f (d))/∂α < 0 is more negative for p = 1 than for p = 0
whenever k(d)2 > k
(c)
2 (corresponding to κd/κc > 3/4), making the competitive dynamics always fiercer in
the former case.
Ultimately, this analysis shows that in heterogeneous and clustered structures, like the ones we used
here, the competitive dynamics takes place more frequently and intensively in the presence of 3-way
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α(1)th =
2kA
kA + ncA − 1
α(2)th =
2kcn
2kcn − 1 − ncA
A
A
A
A
A
α < α(1)th
α > α(1)th
α < α(2)th
α(2)th < α < α(1)th
cycle!
Figure 4. Generic bottleneck trap at work in presence of only links. Cooperators are shown in orange.
Vertex A is the bridge vertex, kA is its degree and ncA is its number of cooperator neighbors (all considered
with same degree kcn to get a unique α
(2)
th and make clearer the illustration). For α
(2)
th < α < α
(1)
th , after some
time steps, the configuration is likely to return to the initial state, giving rise to an endless cycle that avoids
both strategies to spread through the trap. Note that a minimal degree heterogeneity among vertex A and
its neighbors must exists to make the trap work.
(p > 0) than 2-way (p = 0) interactions, in accordance with the observed enlargement of the transition
region when increasing p. It must be said that our analysis does not exclude the existence of other
mechanisms that could further contribute to the observed enlargement.
4.3. Heterogeneous Populations: The Role of Topological Traps
When running a dynamical process on top of a connected structure, there could be microscopic
and mesoscopic configurations which operate as topological traps, blocking the system in a certain state.
Traps represent here the only mechanism able to give rise to asymptotic heterogeneous populations in
which cooperators and defectors co-exist. A trap can have any size and complexity, i.e., it can involve
any number of vertices and develop over many time steps. A particularly simple class of traps is the
bottleneck-type’s, consisting of a sub-hypergraph in which some vertices act as bridges between groups
of vertices of opposite strategy. In rank-3 hypergraphs, they consist of some bridge-vertices gluing links
and/or triangles, as shown in Figure 4.
A trap comes into play when the strategies are updated. According to our setup, it is only the 2-section
of the hypergraph that matters for the strategy update, and the presence of higher-order interactions solely
affects the ranges of values of α for which a local structure can act as a trap. Then, the effect of a bottleneck
trap is fully specified by the comparison between the chosen value of α and the threshold values αths,
defined as those values at which a cooperator and a defector, each with its m-degree sequence, get the
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same final payoff. Any trap other than bottleneck-type is specified simultaneously by a set of coupled αths,
one for any link of the 2-section contributing to the trap.
Whatever is the complexity of a trap, its effectiveness is strictly related to the value of the parameter
β. A trap is able to act if the selection is strong enough, i.e., for high enough values of β. Indeed, β weighs
the proportional contribution of the difference of the payoffs to the update rule. The smaller is β, the
more random the strategy update is, being increasingly disentangled from the payoffs resulting from
the interactions. Accordingly, the MC simulations made for β = 0.1 provide convergence times notably
shorter than the ones found for β = 1. Furthermore, we see also a slight reduction of structural reciprocity
when lowering β, meaning that the structures develop some traps able to further anticipate the survival of
cooperation towards slightly lower values of r.
A critical value of α can either satisfy or not some of the local conditions for producing a trap. In other
words, the found effective densities of cooperators can be the result of an average of both homogeneous
final states (the evolutionary stable states) and/or heterogeneous ones (produced by the traps). It was
already unveiled in [34] that, for the entire set of 2×2 social dilemmas played on different real networks,
the presence of bottleneck traps is strictly related to the degree heterogeneity and the lack of redundant
paths.
To characterize the generic traps for the PGG played on rank-3 simple hypergraphs, similarly to what
is done in [34], we perform two different randomization procedures of the networks (see Section 6 for
details). One randomization preserves both the degree and the local clustering coefficient of each vertex,
while the other preserves the degree correlations up to the second order, i.e., up to the joint 3K-distribution
P(k, k′, k′′). Clustering coefficient and second-order degree correlations are clearly related, but preserving
one does not fully imply preserving the other automatically. Now, since the action of a trap is defined in
multiple time steps (two at least) in which are involved several vertices with overlapping neighborhoods,
the degree correlations of order higher than two should be important in the trapping process. Destroying
those correlations we expect the traps to dissolve. Quite surprisingly, we find that what really matters for
the presence of traps other than the bottleneck-type, is the high value of the local clustering coefficient
(see Figure 5). Preserving the P(k, k′, k′′) distribution without caring of the local clustering, unravels the
initially present traps. We find this for both DM and HK hypergraphs. On the contrary, the presence of
bottleneck traps is clearly negatively correlated with clustering; they are found to be dominant for lowly
clustered networks (scarce of redundant paths) exhibiting strong degree heterogeneity, in line with [34].
5. Conclusions
Collective and, in particular, cooperative phenomena, in which many individuals take part as a group,
are observed in many real systems, among which human society stands out. In this work we investigated
systematically the effect that group (higher-order) interactions have on the evolution of cooperation in
structured populations. We studied the dynamics arising from a population of individuals interacting
by playing a public goods game on top of hypergraphs. While the theory we developed is general, the
numerical simulations specifically regarded rank-3 hypergraphs. In this way, we distinguish whether an
element, when a member of a group (clique), interacts separately, in pair, with each of the other members,
or interacts simultaneously with all of them.
To get the hypergraphs, we made use of an algorithm preserving the pairwise projection of the
structure, which is crucial to satisfy the constraints implicit in the network topology. In fact, although a
pairwise projection can correctly describe who interacts with whom, it cannot account for different types
of interactions, the temporal order in which the latter occur, and whether interactions involve pairs or
larger groups of units. Additionally, the 2-section imposes the maximum possible rank one could reach by
generalizing the herein given procedure. The existence of a maximal size for groups is usually related to a
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Figure 5. Convergence time versus r for the hypergraphs generated from two differently rewired versions
of the used DM networks, with tmax = 5× 104. The inset plots report the number of times the system
has not converged (i.e., the number of times the system got trapped). Left. Randomization preserving
degree and local clustering: traps are frequent in the critical regions. Right. Randomization preserving
second-order degree correlations: no traps left. The values of p are specified in the legend; c0 = 0.5, β = 1.
Note that, in DM hypergraphs, bottleneck traps cannot exist, since they boost a complete percolation of
triangles.
saturation restriction due to some unbalanced cost in forming larger groups. This generally depends on
the nature of the considered system, and addressing its form goes beyond the scope of this work. Here, we
just recognize the existence of such a restriction as encoded in the 2-sections of the used hypergraphs, and
preserve it with our generative method.
Monte Carlo simulations clearly indicated that heterogeneous structures, like the ones obtained from
HK and DM networks, are able to sustain cooperation for notable ranges of values of the synergy parameter
below its critical value. This holds for unstructured populations, whatever the conversion fraction, related
to the order of the interactions. Our findings, therefore, extend the phenomenon of network reciprocity to
rank-3 hypergraphs.
Remarkably, we show a clear evidence that the sustenance of cooperation is stronger when the fraction
of 3-way interactions is increased. Indeed, we attained a monotonous decrease of structural reciprocity with
the increasing of conversion fraction, for hypergraphs derived from both HK and DM networks. Morever,
the level of cooperation is always larger for the hypergraph. It is key noting that this enhanced reciprocity
is exclusively due to the substitution of some closed triads of first-order interactions (3-cliques) with unique
second-order interactions (triangles). In other words, given a heterogeneously-structured population,
cooperation thrives more easily if individuals interacting separately, in pairs, within a closed triad are
made to interact all together. It should be noticed that, considering the synergy factor as independent of
the group sizes, we did not account for explicit synergistic or anti-synergistic effects that could increase
or decrease the found levels of reciprocity. The improvement found here, rather, can be referred to as a
topological synergistic effect allowed by the evolutionary dynamics.
As could be expected from what is known on networks, an important requirement for a significant
reciprocity is the heterogeneity of connections; a separate analysis, not addressed in this work, would be
needed for higher-order generalizations of spatial networks. To prove this, we performed an invasion
analysis able to provide a good estimate for the critical point of emergence of cooperation, for both
hypergraphs with rank equal to 2 and to 3. More generally, the analysis indicated that, the higher the order
of the interactions, the stronger the structural reciprocity is. To be more precise, the marked enhancement
of reciprocity has been found for heterogeneous structures with a null or slightly negative assortativity, in
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Figure 6. Illustration of a single instance of steps 3 and 4 of the algorithm used to generate rank-3 simple
hypergraphs starting from graphs. Note that, removing step 4, we would end up with a simplicial complex.
line with what is reported for networks. According to our analysis, we expect a weaker beneficial effect on
hypergraphs derived from assortative networks.
Furthermore, the invasion analysis allowed us to justify, in comparison with the almost abrupt
transition found in homogeneous structures, the enlargement of the transition region observed for the
used heterogeneous hypergraphs. Relying on their locally-clustered structure, it also allowed to partially
explain why the enlargement grows with the increasing of conversion fraction.
Regarding the heterogeneity of strategies in the asymptotic population, we found the presence of
topological traps preventing the system to converge to a uniform state. We characterized those traps
by means of two randomization procedures. In the used clustered structures, we attended the break-up
of the present traps whenever the chosen randomization did not preserve the local clustering, though
still preserving second-order degree correlations. We show that traps represent the only way to get a
non-uniform asymptotic population.
Finally, by tuning the selection pressure, we found an improvement towards cooperation in conditions
of stronger selection. This is precisely what we expect from how topological traps work. Remarkably, this
shows up the contribution coming from some traps to enlarge the region where cooperative behaviors can
survive.
6. Methods
6.1. Generating Rank-3 Simple Hypergraphs
The algorithm to generate rank-3 simple hypergraphs proceeds as follows:
1. A simple network g = (V0, E0) is generated through some model;
2. From the set of all the 3-cliques in it, a fraction 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 of them is picked uniformly at random;
3. To each of the picked 3-cliques a triangle is associated: if e12 = {v1, v2} , e23 = {v2, v3} , e13 =
{v1, v3} ⊂ E0 are the three edges forming a chosen 3-clique over the subset {v1, v2, v3} ⊂ V0 of
vertices, then the hyperedge (triangle) e123 = {v1, v2, v3} is added to E0;
4. To obtain a simple hypergraph, after a fraction p of 3-cliques has been converted to triangles, an edge
is removed if it is subset of at least one triangle: the three edges e12, e23, e13, being subsets of e123, are
removed from E0.
This procedure generates a rank-3 simple hypergraph H = (V, E), where V = V0 and E is the new set of
hyperedges constructed from E0 through the steps 2–4. The initial network g is the 2-section of H. See
Figure 6 for an illustration of the procedure.
Since the algorithm relies on the amount of 3-cliques present in the base network g, the more clustered
is the latter, the stronger will be the effect of increasing the value of p. In HK (Pt = 1) and DM networks,
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every link is part of at least a 3-clique. Therefore, by tuning p, they allow us to explore the entire range of
hypergraphs from the 2-uniform (p = 0) to the 3-uniform (p = 1).
6.2. Monte Carlo Simulations
Every simulation starts by picking, uniformly at random, a fraction c0 ≡ c(t = 0) of cooperators. For
each fixed set of parameters β, c0 and p, we run 100 simulations over a generated hypergraph and take the
average of both the asymptotic cooperators density and the convergence time, i.e., the number of time
steps the process took to stop. We do it for 10 realizations of the same kind of hypergraph (i.e., stemming
from the same network model), and then average again over them. Whenever the maximum number of
time steps (set to 2× 104) is reached without converging to one of the absorbing states c = 0 or c = 1, the
last value of c is considered.
6.3. Randomization Procedures
We briefly summarize the two randomization procedures implemented for the characterization of
topological traps. The selected number of randomizing steps was 105 for each network.
6.3.1. Preserving Local Clustering Coefficient
Through the following procedure one can randomize a network preserving, besides the degree, also
the local clustering coefficient of each vertex. At each step, two vertices are uniformly chosen at random
and their local clustering coefficient is computed. Two links, one for each vertex, are randomly selected
and interchanged. If the clustering coefficients of the two vertices remain unchanged, the randomizing
step is accepted; otherwise, another two vertices are drawn and the randomization is tried again.
6.3.2. Preserving Second-Order Degree Correlations
This procedure allows to obtain a randomized network with exactly the same degree correlations
up to the second-order, i.e., preserving the joint 3K-distribution P(k, k′, k′′). At each step, two vertices
are uniformly chosen at random and the pair is accepted if only the vertices have equal degree. Then,
two links, one for each vertex, are peaked at random (an interchange performed now would ensure the
conservation of the 2K-distribution P(k, k′)). The degrees of the two vertices at the end of the two selected
links are compared and, if they match, the interchange is performed (now conserving also P(k, k′, k′′));
elseways, two new initial vertices are chosen and the randomization is tried again.
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Appendix A. Critical Point for Uniform Complete Simple Hypergraphs
It is possible to find analytically the critical value of αmcr at which c∞ = 0.5 for a finite m-uniform
complete simple hypergraph with N vertices, in the limit of strong selection (β b  1). The previous
condition makes deterministic the update of the strategies whenever two players with different strategies
match. For large values of N the transition becomes discontinuous and αmsurv, above which c∞ > 0,
converges to αmcr. The following proposition holds:
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Proposition A1. Given a complete m-uniform simple hypergraph (m ≥ 2) with N vertices, the critical value αmcr,
in the limit β b 1, is given by
αmcr = m
N − 1
N −m (A1)
where β is the noise parameter of the Fermi distribution function and b is the fixed contribution a cooperator puts at
each time step.
Proof of Proposition A1. The expression for αmcr follows imposing that the probabilities pd→c and pc→d
that, respectively, a defector becomes a cooperator and vice versa, coincide. Being the hypergraph complete,
each vertex possesses (N−1m−1) neighbors. Therefore, the payoff f
(σ) got by any player with strategy σ reads
f (σ) = b
(
N − 1
m− 1
) [( α
m
− 1
)
σ+ α
m− 1
m
q(σ)
]
(A2)
where q(σ) = q(c) = c0 N/(N − 1)− 1/(N − 1) for a cooperator and q(σ) = q(d) = c0 N/(N − 1) for a
defector. Defining ∆ f ≡ f (c) − f (d), we get
pd→c = q(d)F (∆ f ) = c0 NN − 1F (∆ f ) (A3)
pc→d =
(
1− q(c)
)
(1−F (∆ f )) =
(
1− c0 NN − 1 +
1
N − 1
)
(1−F (∆ f )) (A4)
where F indicates the Fermi distribution function. By equating pd→c and pc→d, and solving with respect
to α, we get
αmcr = m
N − 1
N −m
(
N − 1
m− 1
)
− 1
βb
ln
(
c0
1− c0
)
(
N − 1
m− 1
) (A5)
Taking β b 1, Equation (A1) follows.
Note that, only for c0 = 0.5, Equation (A5) automatically reduces to Equation (A1), meaning that the
prediction is exact for any value of β b in this case. Accordingly, the prediction is very precise also for low
values of β whenever c0 does not differ much from 0.5.
In the limit N → ∞, from Equation (A1), we recover the critical value αmcr = m, which holds for an
infinite well-mixed population, in accordance to Equation (10) evaluated for a m-uniform hypergraph.
Appendix B. Simulations for Further Values of the Initial Fraction of Cooperators
In Figure A1 we report the results of the MC simulations performed on hypergraphs derived from DM
networks for some values of the initial fraction of cooperators, c0, other than 0.5. The enhanced structural
reciprocity when increasing p is confirmed and, additionally, it gets stronger when c0 is increased.
Appendix C. Simulations for the Erdo˝s-Rényi Model
In Figure A2 we show the results of the MC simulations performed on hypergraphs stemming from
ER networks, taking β = 1 and c0 = 0.5. The transitions are always sharp and just below r = 1, as expected
for highly homogeneous structures such as ER networks. Accordingly, the denser and less heterogeneous
case with 〈k〉 = 10, shows a slightly lower reciprocity. Due to the low fraction of 3-cliques, the transitions
are nearly overlapped. Moreover, the average convergence time is always below 300 steps, along with the
absence of traps.
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Figure A1. Asymptotic density of cooperators c (top) and convergence time t (bottom) versus r, for
hypergraphs generated from DM networks with N = 500 vertices and average degree 〈k〉 = 4. The values
of p are specified in the legends; c0 = 0.3 (left) and c0 = 0.7 (right), β = 1. The dashed line at r = 1 indicates
the abrupt transition for a well-mixed population.
Appendix D. On the Role of Cooperator Hubs
Equation (13) relies on the comparison between the payoffs of a cooperator hub and any of its defector
neighbors at the initial round. For any r greater than the value rhub provided by Equation (13), whenever
the cooperator hub and any of its defector neighbors match for the strategy update, it is more probable
that the defector becomes a cooperator than the other way around. For such values of r, the cooperator
hub (or more cooperators hub together, as it is likely to be, by construction, in HK and DM networks) can
start and sustain the formation of a cooperative community, eventually able to expand over the structure
or, at least, to resist to be invaded by any neighboring defective community.
In Figure A3 we show some temporal evolution of the average fraction of cooperators in the
neighborhood of cooperator hubs, q¯(hub), and of cooperator hubs’ defector neighbors, q¯(d), for simulations
ended with c∞ > 0 (not converging), taking α around the respective values of αsurv. It is evident how,
independently of c0, q¯(hub) and q¯(d) rapidly reach values around 0.75–0.85 and 0.3–0.35, respectively.
Therefore, Equation (13) estimates the conditions for which such temporal evolution (or those ending with
c∞ = 1) are likely to start. The prediction gives a clear qualitative justification to the fact that r decreases
(the reciprocity improves) with the increasing of both c0 and s (the rank of the hypergraph). The equation
gives also a good quantitative prediction for c0 roughly between 0.4 and 0.7. Outside this range, the
predicted values of r are, too low for high values of c0, and too high for low values of c0. In other words,
the structures provide a lower and a higher reciprocity, respectively, than the one expected by the only
comparison of the payoffs at the first rounds. The point is that the prediction made through Equation (13)
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Figure A2. Asymptotic density of cooperation c (top) and convergence time (bottom) versus r, for
hypergraphs generated from ER networks with N = 500 vertices, average degree 〈k〉 = 6 (left) and
〈k〉 = 10 (right). The values of p are specified in the legends; c0 = 0.5, β = 1. The dashed line at r = 1
indicates the abrupt transition for a well-mixed population.
is mainly based on the average degree disparity among the hubs and their neighbors, while it does not
consider the dependence on c0 of the probability that any of those hubs and their neighbors select each
other for the strategy update. As long as c0 takes values close enough to 0.5, the main contribution comes
from the degree disparity and Equation (13) works well. However, in asymmetric setups corresponding to
low and high values of c0, the approximation used in Equation (13) is no longer sufficient and, consequently,
αhubth does not give an accurate quantitative estimation of αsurv.
Appendix E. On the Local Clustering Coefficient
Both HK and DM models grow networks whose local clustering coefficient C scales with the degree k
as C(k) = C(1)k−γ. Using the notation km to indicate the m-degree, the latter expression reads C(k2) =
C(1)k2−γ. As reported in Figure A4 (left panels), vertices in a DM network follow exactly this law, by
construction, with C(1) = 2 and γ = 1. Vertices in a HK network (Pt = 1), instead, follow it statistically,
with C(1) ≈ 1.9 and γ ≈ 0.8. Knowing C(k2), one can express the average number of 3-cliques (or
triangles), κ(i), that the neighbors of a vertex i share with it, in terms of k2 only. If κ(i) > 1, then some
overlap exists among those 3-cliques. We used this quantity in our invasion analysis and it is strictly
related with the clustering coefficient C(i) of node i. The number L(i) of links among neighbors of vertex i
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Figure A3. Instances of the temporal evolution of the average fraction of cooperators q¯(hub) in the
neighborhood of cooperator hubs (orange), and of the average fraction of cooperators q¯(d) which are
neighbors of defector neighbors of cooperator hubs (cyan). First row corresponds to c0 = 0.3, second row to
c0 = 0.5, third row to c0 = 0.7. The shown temporal series are obtained for DM networks (p = 0), taking α
around the respective values of αsurv. The hubs are here those vertices with degree above the 98th percentile
of the degree distribution. Very similar results are found for HK networks.
is exactly the number of 3-cliques incident on i. This number, if the 3-cliques cover the entire neighborhood
of i, is the 3-degree k(i)3 when we set p = 1. Then, on one hand,
κ(i) =
2 k(i)3
∣∣∣
p=1
k(i)2
∣∣∣
p=0
(A6)
on the other,
C(i) =
2 k(i)3
∣∣∣
p=1
(k(i)2 (k
(i)
2 − 1))
∣∣∣
p=0
(A7)
and the two quantities are related by
κ(i) = C(i)
(
k(i)2 − 1
)∣∣∣
p=0
(A8)
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Figure A4. Left. Local clustering coefficient C2 versus degree k2 for HK (top) and DM networks (bottom).
Right. The shaded area indicates, for a given value of k(c)2 , the values of k
(d)
2 satisfying Equation (A16);
h(x) = (3/4)
[
(x− 1) +√(x− 1)2 + (4/3)2].
In particular, for DM networks, Equation (A8) becomes
κ(i) = 2
k(i)2 − 1
k(i)2
∣∣∣∣∣
p=0
(A9)
and
k(i)3
∣∣∣
p=1
= (k(i)2 − 1)
∣∣∣
p=0
(A10)
For HK networks (Pt = 1), instead, we get
κ(i) = 1.9
k(i)2 − 1(
k(i)2
)0.8
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
p=0
(A11)
and
k(i)3
∣∣∣
p=1
= 0.95
(
k(i)2 − 1
) (
k(i)2
)0.2∣∣∣∣
p=0
(A12)
In the end, this shows that the values of the structural parameters chosen for the computation of
Equation (17) in the main text (Figure 3) are exact and nearly compatible with DM and HK hypergraphs.
Since the algorithm presented in Section 6, used to generate the hypergraphs, relies on the 2-sections
(base networks), Equations (A6)–(A8) can be generalized to any order. Let us suppose that, from a given
2-section, we can construct uniform hypergraphs with rank up to mmax. To generalize the given algorithm,
let us define pm, for m ∈ {3, . . . , mmax}, as the fraction of m-cliques we transform in hyperedges of degree
m; p3 corresponds to the p used throughout the text. Whenever we take p` = 0, ∀` 6= m, we get a
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m-uniform hypergraph for pm = 1, and its 2-section for pm = 0. Then, given a vertex i, the following
relations hold:
k(i)m
∣∣∣
pm=1
= k(i)2
∣∣∣
pm=0
κ
(i)
m
m− 1
∣∣∣∣∣
pm=1
(A13)
κ
(i)
m
∣∣∣
pm=1
=
(
k(i)2 − 1
)
!
(m− 2)!
(
k(i)2 −m + 1
)
!
∣∣∣∣∣∣
pm=0
C(i)m−1
∣∣∣
pm=1
(A14)
where C(i)m is the generalized rank-m local clustering coefficient of vertex i,
C(i)m =
N(i)m(
k(i)2
m
) (A15)
with k(i)2 = k
(i)
2
∣∣∣
pm=0
. This generalized clustering coefficient is defined as the ratio between the number
N(i)m of m-hyperedges among the neighbors of i, and the maximum possible number of such m-hyperedges.
In particular, C2 is the standard local clustering coefficient defined for graphs. Clearly, if pm+1 is set to 1,
N(i)m corresponds to k
(i)
m+1. Additionally, κ
(i)
m is the average number of m-cliques (or m-hyperedges) that the
neighbors of vertex i share with it. Thanks to the above relations, by just knowing how the rank-m local
clustering coefficient depends on the 2-degree k2, one is able to compute κm and km for any vertex and, in
turn, the correct values of ξm, see Equation (13). From both HK and DM networks, and a large class of
other random models, one can generate uniform hypergraphs with rank not greater than 3.
We now make explicit the form taken by the condition in Equation (23) when C(k2) = C(1)k2−γ and,
to get an algebraic solution, we consider DM networks where γ = 1. After some algebra, Equation (23)
becomes
3
4
(k(c)2 − 1)+
√(
k(c)2 − 1
)2
+
(
4
3
)2 < k(d)2 ≤ 2k(c)2 − 1 (A16)
Similar expressions follow for HK networks by numerically solving the condition in Equation (23).
In Figure A4 (right panel), the shaded area indicates the region of values satisfying Equation (A16). For
such values, the competitive dynamics discussed in the main text exists for p = 1 but not for p = 0. Taking,
for example, k(c)2 = 8, Equation (A16) is fulfilled for k
(d)
2 ∈ [11, 15]. Note also that, for k(d)2 > 2k(c)2 − 1 (i.e.,
the region above the shaded area in Figure A4), the competitive dynamics also exists for p = 0. However,
due to the linear dependence of Equation (16) with respect to α, ∂( f (c) − f (d))/∂α < 0 is always more
negative for p = 1 than for p = 0 whenever k(d)2 > k
(c)
2 , making the competitive dynamics always fiercer in
the former case.
Appendix F. Comparing Results from Randomized Networks
We report in Figure A5 the results of the MC simulations performed for networks randomized
preserving their second order degree correlations but not fully their local clustering coefficient, indeed
lowered to around 0.1. We find r(0) = 0.80 for HK networks (Pt = 1), and r(0) = 0.79 for DM (0.78
and 0.75 without randomization). Additionally, in the critical region, the convergence time is roughly
4 times higher for the latter. This notable discrepancy could be in principle due to both, the higher values
of local clustering of DM hypergraphs with respect to HK hypergraphs (0.73 vs. 0.41, on average), and
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Figure A5. Asymptotic density of cooperators c (top) and convergence time t (bottom) versus r for HK (left)
and DM (right) networks (p = 0) with N = 500 vertices, average degree 〈k〉 = 4 and 〈k〉 = 6, respectively.
The randomization preserves the degree correlations up to the second order, but not the local clustering
coefficient; c0 = 0.5, β = 1. The dashed line at r = 1 indicates the first-order transition for a well-mixed
population.
to the specific properties of the two models. Since the values of r(0) are very close to the ones found
without randomization, this means, on one hand, that the truly important factor responsible for the
structural reciprocity is the degree heterogeneity, and on the other, that the better performance shown by
DM hypergraphs should be mainly ascribed to their specific structure and scarcely to their higher local
clustering.
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